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Fruit and Roots: Transfers of Patents and
the Shared Rights Test of Capital Gain*
by
David K. Pansius**
I. Introduction
Now that the Revenue Act of 19781 has expanded the effective tax advan-
tages of capital gain characterization, it is axiomatic that capital gains consider-
ations will be of increasing importance in the planning and drafting of transfers
of assets. Where "intangible" capital assets are involved, planning problems
become particularly complex, as frequently economic considerations preclude the
use of mechanisms which will necessarily yield capital gain characterization.2
The taxpayer must then attempt to walk a fine, but nonetheless fuzzy and
crooked, line in order to satisfy both his economic and tax objectives. Perhaps
there are no greater uncertainties facing the tax planner than the attempt to
distinguish a license from a sale of a patent. This article will attempt to clarify
and to make more predictable this crucial tax distinction.
An analysis of capital gains characterization of patent transfers must neces-
sarily begin with § 1235. Section 1235 provides an exception from the normal
capital gains rules for certain specially qualified holders.' A "holder" who trans-
fers to an unrelated party4 "all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided
* The author wishes to thank Professor Brookes Billman, Assistant Professor of Law, New
York University, and John L. Ruppert for their kind advice which greatly aided the development
of this article.
** Member of the Bar, State of Colorado. J.D. 1978, University of Denver College of Law;
M.A. 1973, B.A. 1971, University of North Carolina. Associate in the firm of Law, Clark &
Scheid, Denver, Colo.
1 Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
2 For example, when payments are periodic and based on the productivity or use of the
asset transferred, the courts and the Service exhibit a tendency to characterize as ordinary
income payments which, if made in a single specified lump sum, may otherwise have qualified
for capital gain characterization. See note I infra; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit
and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295 (1962); Surrey, Definitional
Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1003-08 (1956). Nonetheless, the
practical economics of patent transfers virtually demands that payments be periodic and tied to
the use of the patent. See, e.g., Lamar v. Granger, 99 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
3 Section 1235(b) defines a "holder" as:
(1) any individual whose efforts created such property, or
(2) any other individual who has acquired his interest in such property in exchange
for consideration in money or money's worth paid to such creator prior to actual
reduction to practice of the invention covered by the patent, if such individual is
neither
(A) the employer of such creator, nor
(B) relating to such creator (within the meaning of subsection (d)).
4 Section 1235 does not apply to transfers to unrelated parties as defined in subsection
1235(d):
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any transfer, directly or indirectly, between
persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of section 267(b); except that in
applying section 267(b) and (c) for purposes of this section -
(1) the phrase "25 percent or more" shall be substituted for the phrase "more than
50 percent" each place it appears in section 267 (b), and
(2) paragraph (4) of section 267(c) shall be treated as providing that the family of
an individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.
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interest therein which includes a part of all such rights" will be granted long-
term capital gain treatment regardless of how long the patent was held and
whether payments are to be made in the form of royalties, even in situations
where the royalties are "contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition" of
the patent transferred.'
Even if a transfer should fail to qualify under § 1235, there remains the
opportunity to attain capital gain treatment through a "sale or exchange" of a
§ 1221 or § 1231 asset.' Once the one-year holding period requirement has
been satisfied, the legal standards which the transferor must meet are essentially
identical to the requirements of § 1235.' In order to satisfy the necessary element
of sale or exchange a transferor must convey "all substantial rights" or "an
undivided interest in all substantial rights of the patent," which is the same basic
test contained in § 1235.8 In fact, when Congress enacted § 1235 it believed,
with one possible exception discussed below,9 that it was codifying the existing
law of sale or exchange as it had been applied to transfers of patents.'" Thus,
the remainder of this article will for the most part ignore possible distinctions
5 I.R.C. § 1235(a).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b) provides that where a transfer fails to qualify under § 1235,
the tax consequences resulting from the transfer "shall be determined under other provisions
of the internal revenue laws." See Rev. Ru!. 69-482, 1969-2 C.B. 164; Rev. Rul. 78-328, 1978-36
I.R.B. 26.
7 Even after the passage of § 1235, the Service adhered to its position, first formalized in
Mimeograph 6490, 1950-1 C.B. 9, that payments based in any respect upon the transferee's
production or use of the patent precluded capital characterization, at least in those instances
not governed by § 1235. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 C.B. 7. The Service abandoned this stance in
Rev. Ru!. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408 where it stated that when § 1235 is inapplicable the basic
question becomes whether the transfer has "sufficient characteristics of a sale to qualify for
capital gain treatment." By recognizing that capital gains treatment could result outside of
§ 1235 on transfers of patents in exchange for a royalty interest the Service acquiesced in
Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946); Roy J. Champayne, 26 T.C. 634 (1956); and Leonard
Coplan, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957) which had judicially reached the same conclusion. The same basic
rules were extended to copyrights in Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26.
8 "By its use of the phrase 'property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent,' we do
not think Congress intended to import into section 1235 any further or different impediments
to capital gain treatment than were contained in section 117 of the 1939 Code." Vincent B.
Rodgers, 51 T.C. 927, 931 (1969), acq., 1973-1 C.B. 2, questioned, Rev. Rul. 78-328. The Tax
Court later overruled its holding in Rodgers that a transfer of patent rights limited geograph-
ically or to a restricted field of use qualifies for capital gain treatment in the case of Don
Kueneman, 68 T.C. 609, 617 (1977), app. pending. However, the court's decision in K-ueneman
tends to imply that the only distinction between the all substantial rights test of § 1235 and the
prior rules of sale or exchange was the Senate's express recognition of capital gain treatment
for transfers of fragmented patents: patents limited geographically or restricted to a particular
field of use. 69 T.C. at 618-19. The question of fragmented patents is discussed in greater detail
at notes 28-37 infra and accompanying text.
Decisions which do not involve fragmentation questions routinely apply the same test of all
substantial rights to both § 1235 and sale or exchange questions.
9 That exception is in the instance where the patent is fragmented into rights limited to a
particular geographic territory or a limited field of use. Fragmented patents are discussed at text
accompanying notes 28-40 infra.
10 The Senate Committee Report to § 1235, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT] states as follows:
The section does not detail precisely what constitutes the formal components of a
sale or exchange of patent rights beyond requiring that all substantial rights evidenced
by the patent (other than the right to such periodic or contingent payments) should be
transferred to the transferee for consideration. This requirement recognizes the basic
criteria of a "sale or exchange" under existing law, with the exception noted relating to
contingent payments, which exception is justified in the patent area for "holders" as
herein defined.
Id. at 439. As was stated in note 7 supra, periodic payments are now recognized as permissible
under the normal capital gains provisions as well.
[Vol. 54: 846]
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between § 1235 and the sale or exchange rules, and focus instead on the concept
of "all substantial rights" or an "undivided interest in all substantial rights."
II. The Shared Rights Test of Capital Gain
The predominant rule to date has been that in order to determine if a
transferor has executed a "sale" of his patent one must first examine whether
the transferor has retained rights of any value in the patent." The argument
follows that if one retains a right in a patent of substantial value, then necessarily
the transferor has failed to part with all substantial rights in the patent, and
thus neither § 1235 nor the sale or exchange rules have been satisfied. This
analysis directed toward the value of retained rights has created conceptual and
factual problems for courts analyzing patent transfers. Instinctively a court must
recognize that if a transferor retains a right in the patent then that right must
be of some significant value to the transferor, otherwise the transferor would not
bother to contract for its retention. Yet a large number of cases have reached
the contrary result, finding particular retained rights to be of insignificant value,
thereby permitting capital gain characterization of the transfer." What has thus
developed has been a laundry list of certain specific rights which a transferor
will be permitted to retain in normal circumstances. What has not developed
is a uniform analysis which explains why particular rights may normally be
retained, while others may not.
Such a uniform analysis emerges only when it is recognized that, contrary
to customary practice, the value of a transferor's retained right is never a relevant
consideration in analyzing the capital gain characterization of a patent transfer.
The proper inquiry requires the application. of the shared rights test: Has the
transferee received at least some fractional share of each and every right of the
patent?" Section 1235 asks if the transferor has conveyed "all substantial rights"
11 With respect to sales or exchanges outside § 1235, a number of courts phrase the all
substantial rights rule in a manner which incorrectly implies that a sale occurs if and only if
the transferor retains no substantial rights in the patent; e.g., "If the grantor retains no sub-
stantial rights in the subject matter of the transfer, then such transfer is a sale rather than a
license." Glen O'Brien Moveable Partition Co., 70 T.C. 492, 500 (1978).
Duplicate misconceptions created for § 1235 are illustrated by the court's reasoning in
Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971). In the hope of eliminating any doubt
that a transfer of a fragmented patent would not qualify for capital gain treatment under
§ 1235, Fawick imposed a stringent two-part test: (1) The taxpayer may not retain any sub-
stantial rights in the patent. (2) The transferee must receive all substantial rights in the patent.
436 F.2d at 663. Although the latter concern that the transferee receive all substantial rights
is perfectly proper, the initial requirement that the transferor retain nothing of value only
distorts the all substantial rights test. See text accompanying notes 13-23 infra. The two-step
test of Fawick was also repeated in Mros v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1974). See
David R. Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 13 (1976), app. pending.
Unfortunately, even the legislative history sloppily emphasizes the value of the rights
retained by the transferor. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 440. As a notable contrast the
Service's regulations are careful to emphasize the nature of what was conveyed to the transferee
rather than what was retained by the transferor. See notes 30 and 59 infra.
12 These permissible retained rights will be discussed in the remainder of this article.
13 An imperfect judicial expression of the shared rights test can be distilled from the follow-
ing language of DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl. 1961):
"When a patent owner gives not only the right to operate under the patent but in addition
conveys all or a part of his remaining rights in the patent '(particularly the right to exclude
others from using the idea) in exchange for money, the disposition is complete."
[June 1979]
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or an "undivided interest in all substantial rights" of the patent. By its express
terms the statute focuses exclusively on what was received or conveyed, not on
what was retained. If the transferee has received all substantial rights in the
patent, or an undivided share in all substantial rights to the patent, or a frac-
tional share of some rights and an exclusive share of the remainder, then by the
language of the "all substantial rights" rule a "sale" has been executed; the
necessary rights have been conveyed regardless of what interest the transferor may
or may not have retained in the patent.
Since the retained rights test ignores what the transferee receives, that test
can never provide a uniform mechanism for judging patent transfers. In order
to illustrate this point, apply the retained rights test to the transfer of a fractional
share (or undivided interest in all substantial rights) of a patent. The retained
rights test would require that the transfer be denied capital gains characterization,
as the fractional share retained by the transferor is unquestionably a substantial
valuable right in the patent. The uncontradicted rule, however, is that transfers
of undivided interests in all substantial rights of a patent satisfy the capital gains
rule of § 1235, as well as §§ 1221 and 1231."4 The retained rights test and the
undivided interest rule are thus in irreconcilable conflict. As a consequence,
authorities which view the value of the transferor's retained interest to be de-
terminative of capital gain characterization are in error for failing to consider
the impact of the undivided interest rule. 5
A shared rights test, however, provides a consistent analysis of both the
undivided interest and the all substantial rights rule. The shared rights test asks
if the transferee has received or shares each and every substantial right to the
patent. Where the transferee at least shares all substantial rights in the patent, the
requirement that the transferee receive all substantial rights in the patent has
been satisfied. In this manner the undivided interest rule merely states a particular
application of the shared rights test: Even though the transferee only shares each
substantial right of the patent, all substantial rights have nonetheless been received
and capital gain treatment may result.
The shared rights test may be restated in terms of the transferor by posing
two questions: (1) Did the transferor own at least some share in each and every
right of the patent prior to the transfer? And (2) are those rights retained by the
transferor also shared with the transferee? Affirmative answers yield capital gains
characterization. Significantly, this test ignores the value of any retained rights.
In fact, it is presumed that any right retained by the transferor will be of value,
otherwise the transferor would not have bothered to retain it. However, if the
right retained by the transferor is also shared with the transferee, then the trans-
feree has nonetheless received all substantial rights or an undivided interest in all
14 In addition to the express language of § 1235 see, e.g., Parke, Davis & Co., 31 B.T.A. 427
(1934); Lamar v. Granger, 99 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Massey v. United States, 226
F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1955). In Waterman v. MacKenzie, a case which did not involve the tax
law, the Supreme Court defined the sale of a patent to include the "undivided part or share"
of "the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the United States."
138 U.S. 252, 255 "(1891).
15 Significantly, most of the cases listed in note 11 suprai as expressing a retained rights
approach to the all substantial rights rule cite with approval Bell Intercontinental Corp. v.
United States, 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
[Vol. 54:846]
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substantial rights of the patent. The transferee owns outright or shares each
substantial right of the patent.
III. All Substantial Rights and Assignment of Income
Assignment of income principles further illustrate the supremacy of the
shared rights test. At the outset this article characterized the all substantial rights
rule as a mechanism for distinguishing a sale from a license (or lease) of a patent.
Although true, this statement can be misleading. To qualify for capital gains
characterization a transferor must do more than "sell" "property"; the transferor
must sell property of a nature which qualifies for capital gain characterization. As
the Supreme Court stated in Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., "[I]t is evident that
not everything which can be called property in the ordinary sense and which is
outside the statutory exclusions qualifies as a capital asset."' 6 Whereas retained
rights analysis may indicate whether a transfer of property has occurred sufficient
to tax the transferee rather than the transferor on the subsequent "earnings"? of
that property, 7 retained rights analysis does not evaluate the nature of the
property interest itself. As a result a retained rights test cannot determine whether
the rights transferred are sufficient to amount to property which qualifies as a
capital asset. 8 Since the shared rights test alone evaluates what the transferee
receives, it is the only test that properly addresses the "property" aspect of the
capital gains characterization rules.
Viewed from this "property" perspective, the shared rights test will emerge
from the application to patent transfers of the vertical/horizontal analysis of
assignment of income championed by Charles Lyon and James Eustice in their
article, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake
Case." In analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in P. G. Lake, Inc.,"° the
authors drew the distinction between the transfer of a mere right to an oil pay-
ment over a specified term and the transfer of the entire depletable interest, or a
fraction of the entire depletable interest, over the entire life of the mineral interest.
The former was a "horizontal slice," and advance sale of fruit. Since the fruit
would generate ordinary income if sold separately, an advance sale of fruit must
yield ordinary income as well. A contrary result is reached in the latter instance
where a "vertical slice" has been conveyed. Where the entire or an undivided
interest in the entire mineral interest has been conveyed, the fruit-bearing tree as
well as the fruit has been conveyed and capital characterization will result."
16 Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). In Gillette,
the Court held that compensation for the temporary exercise of control over business facilities
by the U.S. Government did not qualify for capital gain characterization. The Court found that
the Government did not take the facilities themselves but took only the right to determine the
use to which those facilities were to be put.
17 See, e.g., the discussion of assignment of production payments in F. BURKE & R. BowHA v,
INcmm TAXATiON OF NATURAL RESOURCES § 6.04-6.13 (1979).
18 "[T]he term 'capital asset' is to be construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose
of Congress to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the realization
of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus to ameliorate the
hardship of taxation of the entire gain in one year." 364 U.S. at 134.
19 17 TAX L. REv. 295 (1962).
20 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
21 17 TAx L. REV. at 307-09. See id. at 377-79.
[June 1979]
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Where intangible assets are at issue, it can become difficult to distinguish an
advance sale of fruit from the transfer of a tree since the tree itself is of .an
indefinite character. Thus to better understand the shared rights analysis of patent
transfers it is useful to extend the fruit and tree metaphor one step further and
distinguish between the fruit and the roots. Each right in a patent is in essence a
root of the fruit-bearing tree. The all substantial rights rule requires that for a
sale of a tree to occur the transferee must obtain the right to tap into each root
or right of the patent. Since fractional interests are permitted it is immaterial that
the transferor's retained "tree" may also tap into roots used by the transferee. All
that matters is that the transferee's interest can use each and every root of the
patent, regardless of what other trees may also share some or all of those same
roots.
Oversimplifying to some extent, whenever one receives at least some share of
all of the rights in an asset, i.e., a share of all of the roots, then it follows that one
has received some form of tree. It has been argued that, as a matter of policy, the
nature of the asset transferred should be determinative of whether capital gain or
ordinary income treatment results.2 2 Since an asset satisfying the shared rights
test will always represent a "tree," it follows that the transfer of a productive
asset satisfying the shared rights test should also qualify for capital gain treatment.
Although discussed to some extent in the footnotes, the text of this article
does not consider whether the shared rights test does or should represent the line
which separates capital assets from assets embodying only ordinary income.
Neither will this article address the extent to which the shared rights test may
represent the line distinguishing "vertical from horizontal" cuts in the partial
transfers of other assets besides patents. The analysis below is directed solely to
the all substantial rights test as applied to patent transfers. For a number of
reasons the fruit and roots or shared rights analysis may be suitable only for
transfers of patents.2"
It is important to emphasize that the shared rights, or fruit and roots,
analysis forces a court or a planner to shift his inquiry away from what was re-
tained by the transferor to what was received by the transferee - did the trans-
feree receive at least some interest in each and very right of the patent? In most
22 Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income -the Ferrer Case,
20 TAx L. REv. 1 (1964). See also Surrey, supra note 2.
23 One potential difference lies in the unusual benefits granted transferors of patents. In most
instances, mineral interests and trademarks being but two examples, periodic payments based
on the transferee's use of the asset conveyed will be treated as ordinary income, even though the
"tree" may have been conveyed by the seller. In the case of patents, should a tranferor meet
the "sale" test, the entire consideration including the periodic payments receive capital charac-
terization. Based on this generous result bestowed on patent transfers, it is only natural that the
roots become as important as the tree. Additionally, since the patent as an intangible asset is
definable only as a "bundle of rights," in a certain sense the tree becomes indistinguishable from
the roots anyway. Nonetheless, one can tentatively posit the following two-part test of capital
gain:
(1) Is the underlying asset either in the nature of an investment or does it create
income when put to productive use? (P. G. Lake and Gillette Motor Transport,
Inc.) and
(2) After the transfer, is the transferee's interest in that asset subordinate to any
other interest in that asset; i.e., did the transferee receive at least some share in
each and every right of the asset?
Certainly these broad rules must defer to special considerations relating to the nature of
the specific property involved.
[Vol. 54: 846]
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instances to apply this test one need only examine whether every right retained by
the transferor is also shared with the transferee. In this manner, if the transferor
owned all substantial rights prior to the transfer, then the transferee's tree will
have access to each and every root and the sale of a capital asset will result.
However, if the transferor did not own or share all substantial rights prior to the
transfer, then no capital characterization can result regardless of what the trans-
feror did or did not retain. The shared rights test must always be applied together
with the requirement that the transferee receive at least some part of each and
every right to the patent.
IV. Legislative History and Shared Rights
Before applying the shared rights test to actual court decisions, it is useful
to examine whether "shared rights" also explains the legislative history behind
the enactment of § 1235 and the codification of the all substantial rights test.
The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that the language in § 1235
which grants capital gain treatment to transfers of an undivided interest in all
substantial rights of a patent refers only to transfers of the identical fractional
interest in each and every right of the patent.24 This reasoning would preclude
the shared rights test, as that test assumes that in a qualifying transfer the trans-
feree may often receive differing "fractional" interests in each substantial right;
indeed, the transferee must receive exclusive interests in all rights with the excep-
tion of those retained rights which the transferor and the transferee share.
Significantly, no explicit support for the Service's apparent position can be
found in the legislative history: The definition of "undivided interest" contained
in the Senate Report is as follows:
By "undivided interest" a part of each property right represented by
the patent (constituting a fractional share of the whole patent) is meant
(and not, for example, a lesser interest such as a right to income, or a
license limited geographically, or a license which conveys some, but not all,
of the claims or uses covered by the patent) 25
The Senate's reference to "a part of each property right" as meaning "a fractional
share of the whole patent" might well be taken as evidence that the Senate
intended to require that a transfer of an undivided interest constitute a transfer
of the identical fractional interest in each right of the patent. However, the lan-
guage of the Report did not refer to "the identical fractional share of the whole
patent," nor did the language refer to "the identical part of each property right
represented by the patent." If anything, the Senate's definition of "undivided
interest" would indicate that Congress did not expressly consider the shared rights
test posited above. Rather, Congress only meant to insure that transfers of frag-
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) states in part: "A person owns an 'undivided interest' in all
substantial rights to a patent when he owns the same fractional share of each and every sub-
stantial right to the patent." See Rev. Rul. 59-175, 1959-1 C.B. 213, 214-15.
25 SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 439 (emphasis added).
[June 1979]
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mented patents, i.e., patents limited geographically or restricted in field of use,
be denied capital gain treatment."
Moreover, the Service's view of undivided interest contradicts the Senate's
apparent intent to grant certain minimum interests potential capital gain charac-
terization. Under the Service's rule "all substantial rights" have not been trans-
ferred in those instances where, instead of owning the identical fractional interest
in each and every right of the patent, the transferee owns an exclusive interest in
some of the rights. No capital gain characterization will result under the un-
divided interest rule since the transferee's exclusive rights result in differing frac-
tional interests in the rights which the transferee received. If, however, the trans-
feror denied the transferee his exclusive rights and transferred only a fractional
share identical to the fractional share of the remaining rights, capital gain charac-
terization is now permitted according to the undivided interest rule. Thus, under
the Service's test, by transferring a lesser interest, the transferor may convert
ordinary income into capital gain.
Congress could never have intended such a contradictory result. The lan-
guage of the Senate Report quoted above expresses a concern over transfers of
interests in patents which are lesser interests than transfers of an undivided part
of a patent. 7 Since any interest which satisfies the shared .rights test must also
constitute an interest which is greater than or equivalent to the explicitly endorsed
undivided interest in all substantial rights to the patent, the Senate Report cannot
be interpreted to preclude the shared rights test. In fact, the Senate's reference to
lesser interests would imply that any interest which satisfies the shared rights test
necessarily satisfies the all substantial rights rule. If a transfer of an undivided
interest in a patent is a transfer of all substantial rights, then so must the transfer
of the equivalent or greater interest, the interest which satisfies the shared rights
test, also qualify as a transfer of all substantial rights.
Coincidentally, the converse of the shared rights test - there is no transfer
of an undivided interest unless all substantial rights in the patent are at least
shared - when rigidly applied, eliminates the need to expressly deny capital gain
characterization to transfers of fragmented patents in exchange for payments
contingent on use. As noted above, the Senate expressly excluded from § 1235
transfers of such lesser interests as "a right to income, or a license limited geo-
graphically, or a license which conveys some, but not all, of the claims or uses
covered by the patent." These forbidden examples each represent instances where
the transferor has failed to satisfy the shared rights test: Where a transferor parts
with only an income interest, at minimum he retains the unlimited right to create
further sublicenses; this right is not shared with the transferee and thus there can
be no "sale" under the all substantial rights rule. Similarly, where the transferred
patent is limited geographically, the transferor retains the exclusive right, not
shared with his transferee, to use the patent in the remaining geographic terri-
26 In Estate of Klein, 507 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975),
rev'g, 61 T.O. 332, the court intimated that the purpose behind the Senate's reference to "a
part of each property right" and "a fractional share of the whole patent" was limited to dis-
tinguishing undivided interests from fragmented patents. 507 F.2d at 621.
27 Lamar v. Granger, 99 F. Supp. 17, 38 (W.D. Pa. 1951) also spoke of an interest less than
an undivided share as being a mere license.
[VoI. 54:846]
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tory. Finally, where the transferor parts with only some of the claims or uses of
the patent the remaining claims or uses are held exclusively by the transferor and
not shared with the transferee; the shared rights test has not been satisfied.
Despite the language of the Senate Report, only recently in the Kuenemann"
decision did the Tax Court take the position that a transfer of a fragmented
patent could not qualify for capital gain treatment under § 1235. The reasoning
had been that if all substantial rights to the fragment had been conveyed then the
all substantial rights test had been satisfied,29 and that the Service's regulations
to the contrary were in error." To a great extent this conclusion had been based
on the decision of Waterman v. McKenzie, which in defining what constituted a
sale of a patent expressly endorsed transfers limited geographically. 1 The Water-
man case did not involve the tax law, however, and thus has no real precedence
with respect to the subsequently created and legislated "all substantial rights"
rule. Kuenemann recognized this distinction32 and brought the Tax Court in line
with the prior holdings of the courts of appeal which had consistently held that
fragmented transfers could not qualify for capital gain characterization under
§ 1235."3
Since the rationale for the current ban on fragmentation rests in the legisla-
tive history of § 1235, it can be argued that "all substantial rights" has a different,
more permissive meaning when used to judge the sale or exchange of a § 1221 or
§ 1231 asset. 4 The reasoning would be as follows: Since § 1235 also preserved a
transferor's ability to resort to normal capital gain rules and since fragmentation
had been permissible under normal capital gain rules prior to § 1235,"5 then so
should fragmentation still be permitted outside the scope of § 1235." 5 The result
of this theory would be that with respect to fragmentation issues "all substantial
28 Don Kueneman, 68 TIC. 609 (1977).
29 Vincent B. Rodgers, 51 T.C. 927 '(1969), acq., 1973-1 C.B. 2, questioned, Rev. Rul.
78-328. See Estate of Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1974) ; Thomas
L. Fawick, 52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971); William S. Rouverol,
42 T.C. 186 (1964), nonacq., 1965-2 C.B. 7.
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1) states in part:
The term "all substantial rights to a patent" does not include a grant of rights
to a patent -
(i) Which is limited geographically within the country of issuance;
(iii) Which grants rights to the grantee, in fields of use within trades or indus-
tries, which are less than all the rights covered by the patent, which exist and have
value at the time of the grant; or
(iv) Which grants to the grantee less than all the claims or inventions covered by
the patent which exist and have value at the time of the grant.
31 138 U.S. at 255.
32 68 T.C. at 617-18.
33 Estate of Klein, 507 F.2d 617 "(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975), rev'g,
61 T.C. 332; Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g, T.C. Memo 1971-123;
Fawick v. 'Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971), rev'g, 52 T.C. 104.
34 Cohen & Suttle, Transferring Patents and Know-How, 8 TAx ADVISOR 346, 350 (1977).
35 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3rd Cir. 1958); United States v. Car-
ruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955) ; First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. United States, 136 F.
Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1955); Estate of Milton P. Laurent, 34 T.C. 385 (1960), nonacq., 1961-2
C.B. 6; Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544 (1955), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 6.
36 See also Allied Chem. Corp. v. United States, 66-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd, 370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26. See generally Bell Inter-
continental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1967). But see also Redler
Conveyor Co. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1962) (transfers of patents limited in
field of use were licenses and not sales, thereby creating personal holding company income).
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rights" would have two different meanings.
However, by reading the word "all" to truly mean all substantial rights, the
shared rights test precludes such an unjustified "double standard." As pointed out
above, whenever a patent is fragmented all substantial rights are not conveyed;
the retained rights of the transferor are not shared with the transferee. Since the
transferor has kept some of the roots for his exclusive use, capital characterization
must be denied. Considering that § 1235 was designed to provide special relief
for qualified holders, a broader test of sale or exchange under §§ 1222 and 1231
would generate an incongruous result, and would indeed substantially frustrate
the intent of Congress.37
The shared rights test, however, does not preclude capital gain characteriza-
tion of patent fragments in all circumstances. A patent limited geographically or
to a particular field of use nonetheless represents property capable of supporting
capital gain characterization. If a transferor were to convey at least some share
of all substantial rights in the fragment in exchange for a fixed sum rather than
payments contingent on use, possibly the legislative prohibition created coincident
37 Congress enacted § 1235 to satisfy two purposes: first, to insure that certain transfers of
patents in exchange for payments contingent on use would be granted capital gain treatment
despite the contrary position taken by the Service; and second, to insure that capital gains
benefits were easily available to the ordinary inventor so as to provide a special incentive to the
inventor. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 439. See, e.g., Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d
655, 661 (6th Cir.-1971).
Although a portion of the special incentive of § 1235 was relief from having to satisfy the
holding period requirement, it would seem nonetheless contradictory to impose on the inventor a
restricted test of sale or exchange which need not be satisfied once outside the confines of
§ 1235. See David R. Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 17 (1976), app. pending, which stated: "We see no
reason why section 1235 should be more strictly applied [than §§ 1221 and 1222]." Stated in
the converse, there is no reason. why §§ 1221 and 1222 should contain a test of sale or exchange
more permissive than the legislative rule expressed in § 1235.
The argument for symmetry between §§ 1221 and 1235 gains additional credence when
examined in terms of Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 C.B. 164. In that ruling the Service stated that
§ 1235 was not the exclusive capital gains rule for "holders" of patents.
By applying Rev. Rul. 69-482 to the specific problem of fragmented patents a permissive
definition of "all substantial rights" under § 1221 would create a loophole whereby inventors
(aside from possibly professional inventors) could obtain capital gain characterization of frag-
mented patent transfers merely by holding the property long enough to satisfy the one-year
holding period requirement. Without symmetry in the application of the "all substantial rights"
rule the practical impact of the legislative prohibition regarding transfers of patent fragments
has been substantially frustrated.
Of course the same reasoning applies with respect to the express statutory prohibition
regarding transfers to related parties. Significantly, although later courts have distinguished
Poole, its reasoning requiring the exclusivity of § 1235 as applied to "holders" has yet to be
expressly rejected, leaving open the possibility that the service was too generous in promulgating
Rev. Rul. 69-482. See, e.g., Newton Insert Co., 61 T.C. 570 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 545 F.2d
1259 (9th Cir. 1976) (although Poole may deny capital gain characterization to a transfer
described in § 1235 which does not satisfy § 1235, normal rules apply with respect to whether
a sale has occurred for purposes of applying § 1245). Ray E. Omholt, 60 T.C. 541, 547 n.7
(1973), acq. (neither party argued that § 1235 exclusively governed the transaction in ques-
tion). Lan Jen Chu, 58 T.C. 598, 608 n.1 '(1972) (argument that § 1235 operated to preclude
capital gains characterization not raised by the Service); Thomson v. United States, 25
A.F.T.R. 2d 70-697 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (Poole does not necessarily deny capital gains treatment
to transfers by "nonholders" in exchange for payments contingent on use). See also David R.
Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 12 n.4 (1976) (taxpayer did not raise the alternative theory that capital gain
characterization was warranted under other sections beside § 1235). Indeed, at least one court
has followed Poole, rejecting the view that a holder who transfers a patent to a related person
in exchange for contingent payments may nonetheless seek capital gain characterization outside
the confines of § 1235. William W. Taylor, 1970 T.C.M. 1 70,325, at 1633 n.7.
38 See cases cited at note 35 supra.
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with the enactment of § 1235 will be avoided. 9 The transfer will satisfy the
shared rights test since the transferee received at least some share of each substan-
tial right in a contract (as distinguished from a patent) which itself qualifies as
capital property."
Before addressing further applications of the shared rights test one additional
comment must be made about the legislative history of § 1235. The Senate Report
expressly permits a transferor to "retain" in the patent conditions subsequent or
similar devices in the nature of security interests, including title to the patent."
In other words the transferor may assert against the patent a lien for nonpayment
of royalties or similar breach by the transferee. Such security devices are outside
the application of the all substantial rights rule as they do not truly involve the
beneficial rights of the patent.42
V. The Shared Rights Test and Retained Benefits
To summarize once more, capital gain characterization of an asset transfer
should turn, not on factual questions of value, but rather on the legal character
of the asset conveyed. Only the shared rights test limits the all substantial rights
rule to an exclusively legal inquiry: The shared rights test assumes that a retained
interest is valuable, otherwise it would not appear in the contract. If the parties
treat an interest as substantial by placing it in their contract, the courts should be
relieved of having to reevaluate that interest for purposes of the tax laws. The
true issue is not value, but whether the retained right is shared with the transferee
so that the transferee can be said to have received at least a part of all substantial
rights in the patent, thereby meeting the requirement of a sale. The analysis
39 Section 1235 was enacted to provide special rules where, in part, the payment received
was in the nature of royalties. See, e.g., Thomson v. United States, 25 A.F.T.R. 2d 697
(E.D.N.Y. 1969); note 37 supra. Where payments are for fixed consideration a transaction of
the nature described in § 1235 has not occurred. Thus, the legislative ban to fragmented trans-
fers by holders under § 1235, and as extended by implication to transfers by nonholders under
§ 1221, should be inapplicable. Rather, capital gain characterization should be assessed under
the rules applicable to the sale of contract rights. See notes 51, 52, and 65 infra.
40 See the two-part test of capital gain posited in note 23 supra.
41 "[R]etention by the transferor of rights in the property which are not of the nature of
rights evidenced by the patent and which are not inconsistent with the passage of ownership,
such as a security interest (e.g., a vendor's lien) or a reservation in the nature of a condition
subsequent (e.g., a forfeiture on account of nonperformance) are not to be considered as such a
retention as will defeat the applicability of this section." SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 440.
See Treas. Reg. § 1235-2(b) (2).
42 A security device will return the patent to the transferor only upon the buyer's default.
Since the event of default is beyond the control of the transferor, no right in the patent has been
retained by the transferor. This distinction based on right to control is approved by the Service
in Rev. Rul. 75-202, 1975-1 C.B. 170 regarding whether a sale of a copyright has occurred.
See also, Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3rd Cir. 1958); Watson v. United States,
222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955); Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258, 264 (1946), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 6.
However, should a transfer of patent rights be terminable at the election of the transferer at
any time prior to the expiration of the patent, then from the seller's standpoint the patent is no
longer just collateral to insure performance on the contract; the transferor has now retained a
reversionary interest in the patent. This retained reversion necessarily violates the shared rights
test, and capital characterization must be denied the transfer. Young v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d
89 (2d Cir. 1969); Jacques R. Milberg, 52 T.C. 315 (1969); Franz Martini, 38 T.C. 168
(1962); Andrew Szegari, 1975 T.C.M. 75,284 (1975). An analogous rule exists with respect to
trade secrets where the transfer must be at least for the duration of the useful life of the tech-
nology transferred. Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967); Taylor-Winfield
Corp., 57 T.C. 205 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 30 A.F.T.R. 2d 5711 (6th Cir. 1972); Julian A.
McDermott, 41 T.C. 50 (1963).
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below illustrates how the shared rights test, because it is a legal rather than a
factual test, creates order and consistency in areas which heretofore have been
characterized only by confusion.
The application of the shared rights rule is most easily visualized in instances
where the transferor has retained a benefit of the patent itself. Consider, for
example, a transfer of a patent where the taxpayer omits to transfer the right
to use, or expressly reserves the right to use, the patented product. The almost
universal position of the courts has been that this retained right in the patent is
not substantial enough to defeat capital gain characterization.43 The Senate
Report itself expressly pointed to the retained right to use as a prominent example
of a retained interest which is ordinarily not substantial."
A proper analysis, however, reaches this conclusion by applying the shared
rights test. A retained right to use will not defeat a sale of a patent because the
transfer of the rights to manufacture and sell necessarily implies that the right to
use has been transferred as well." In other words the right to use is now shared
between the transferor and transferee; the transferor's retained right in no way
detracts from the transferee's full use and enjoyment of the patent and a sale thus
results." If, however, the transferor had expressly denied certain use rights to the
recipient of the patent, no sale should result as rights are no longer shared.4" The
de minimus value rule will never address this distinction, although, as a practical
matter, with respect to this particular right the distinction may never become
important.
A far more difficult problem is presented when the transferor has retained
the right to use the patent itself, as well as the patented article, i.e., a nonexclusive
license. Although not an application of the all substantial rights rule, United
States v. Dresser" in substance examined that very issue. In Dresser the original
patent owner transferred to the taxpayer an exclusive license to patent rights
relating to a method and apparatus for logging oil wells, reserving to itself a
nonexclusive license. Some time later the taxpayer transferred back to the original
owner the exclusivity feature of its license in exchange for the fixed sum of
$500,000 payable out of 25% of gross receipts. The net result was that the tax-
payer now owned a nonexclusive license and the original owner now owned the
exclusive license. 9
Under the retained rights test of the all substantial rights rule, no sale of a
43 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 343 (3rd Cir. 1958); Rollman v. Commis-
sioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957); C. A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816
(D. Colo. 1967); Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935 '(N.D. Cal. 1959); Gruber v.
United States, 158 F. Supp. 510 (D. Ore. 1957); A. E. Iickman, 29 T.C. 864 (1958);
Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138 (1956), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 6; William W. Taylor, 1970 T.C.M.
11 70,325 (1970).
44 "IThe courts have recognized that an exclusive license agreement in some instances may
constitute a sale for tax purposes even where that right to 'use' the invention has not been
conveyed to the licensee." See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (3) (ii).
45 See C. A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 821 (D. Colo. 1967);
Flanders v. United States, 172 F. S.upp. 935, 950 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
46 Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 1952).
47 The regulations and the legislative history would seemingly permit exceptions. See note
44 supra.
48 324 F.2d 56"(5th Cir. 1963).
49 9 A.F.T.R. 2d 1597 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
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capital asset would result, as clearly the nonexclusive license retained by the tax-
payer represented substantial rights in the patent or the asset. The court, however,
only analyzed whether the transfer of the exclusivity feature alone was the sale of
a capital asset. The court determined that it was5" distinguishable from an earlier
case which had apparently held to the contrary."'
The identical result is reached by applying the shared rights test as if an
entire interest in a patent had been conveyed. Admittedly the exclusivity feature
itself did not embody a share of all rights in the patent. However, because the
transferee already owned a nonexclusive license, at the close of the transfer it
owned all rights in the patent, subject only to outstanding nonexclusive licenses;
i.e., the transferee owned at least some share of all substantial rights in the patent.
Viewed in this perspective it is but a short step to say that when a nonexclusive
license is reserved at the time an entire patent is transferred, at least some share
of all substantial rights has been conveyed and therefore a sale must result.5"
Although distinguishable if for no other reason than payment was in the form
of a fixed sum, 3 Dresser is nonetheless instructive as its consideration of the ex-
clusivity feature alone tends to highlight a question which has plagued courts
attempting to apply the retained rights test of value to partial transfers of patent
interests: In order to transfer "all substantial rights of the patent" must a
transferor convey all substantial rights of the patent then existing, or need the
transferor convey only all those rights which he owns at the time of the transfer?
Under the shared rights test the answer is of course neither. The true inquiry is:
"Did the transferor convey some part of each and every substantial right of the
patent?" An affirmative response creates a sale of a patent, regardless of what the
transferor owned at the time of the transfer, regardless of what the transferor
50 324 F.2d at 58-61.
51 In Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 301 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1962) the
court characterized as ordinary income payments received in exchange for the exclusivity feature
of a patent. The court stated that the royalty payments received by the seller represented but a
substitute for the ordinary income which the seller would have received had he himself assigned
nonexclusive licenses in the patent. The court cited, inter alia, P. G. Lake and Gillette Motor
Transport, Inc.
Dresser distinguished Halliburton on the basis that the transferor in Dresser could not
execute any sublicenses; therefore, payments received in exchange for the exclusivity right could
not be construed as a substitute for ordinary income which the transferor otherwise would have
earned. 324 F.2d at 59. However, in Halliburton the transferor similarly could not execute any
sublicenses without the consent of the owner of the nonexclusive license. Consequently, this
basis for distinguishing the two cases appears to be weak.
The true distinguishing feature between Dresser and Halliburton is the nature of the
payment. The transferor in Dresser was entitled only to a fixed sum, albeit payable out of gross
receipts. Halliburton however received the right to one-third of all future royalties which its
transferee received on subsequent sublicenses that it was to execute. This apparent distinction
between Halliburton and Dresser conforms to the hypothetical alternatives to § 1235 posed at
text accompanying notes 38-40 supra and 65 infra.
52 Alternatively, apply the two-part test of capital gain posited in note 19 supra. The under-
lying productive asset at issue is a patent, clearly a capital asset within the limits described in
Gillette Motor Transport, Inc. What the transferee received through the exchange of the ex-
clusivity feature was that crucial right in the patent which transformed his nonexclusive license
into an exclusive license. In other words, the exclusivity feature was that crucial right which
transformed a noncapital asset (at least with respect to the patent rules) into a capital asset.
See the discussion of nonexclusive licenses at text accompanying notes 54-92 infra. Since the
exclusivity feature was the critical right necessary for capital gain characterization of the
underlying property, then so must the exclusivity feature itself be property worthy of capital
gain characterization.
53 See note 51 supra.
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sold prior to the transfer, and, most importantly, regardless of what the transferor
may have retained for himself at the time of transfer. The courts have had ex-
treme difficulty with these issues because they have yet to ask the proper question.
Once the proper test is applied, the proper result is readily reached.
In First National Trust and Savings Bank of San Diego v. United States, 4
the court considered whether a transferor had conveyed all substantial rights to
the patent where the rights transferred were subject to a nonexclusive license
previously granted by the transferor. The court ruled that to qualify as a sale of a
capital asset the transferor must convey all of the rights outstanding in the patent,
not just the rights owned by the transferor at the time of the transfer: " 'Rights
to a patent' means the traditional rights given the inventor by a patent; 'all
substantial rights' means all of those original rights which are of value at the time
the rights to a patent (or an undivided interest therein) are conveyed." 55
Although San Diego has been much criticized,56 and although the result is
clearly incorrect,5 7 one must credit the San Diego court with at least adopting
the proper approach to the retained interest, if not the proper analysis. Ad-
mittedly, San Diego paid obligatory obeisance to the retained rights test and noted
that the royalties which the transferor was continuing to receive under the out-
standing nonexclusive license represented the retention of a substantial right in
the patent.5 " However, the true concern of San Diego was not with what was
retained but rather with whether all substantial rights were received by the
transferee. The court defined all substantial rights in terms of the "traditional
rights" of a patent, not what rights the transferor happened to own at the time
of transfer or even at some earlier time.55 All that San Diego failed to recognize
was that the outstanding nonexclusive license was merely a bundle of "shared"
rights; the transferee in fact received some part of each and every substantial
right of the patent and therefore a sale should have resulted.
The decisions postdating San Diego generally reach the correct result, but
do so by employing improper reasoning thereby furthering continued litigation.
In Donald C. MacDonald" the court considered whether the transfer of a patent
subject to an outstanding royalty-free nonexclusive license was a sale for purposes
of §§ 1221 and 123 1. The court properly found that a sale had occurred, rejecting
the reasoning of First National Trust and Savings Bank of San Diego v. United
States.6 MacDonald framed the test purely from the standpoint of what the
54 200 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
55 Id. at 281.
56 See, e.g., Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Donald C. MacDonald, 55 T.C. 840 (1971).
57 See text accompanying notes 79-89 infra.
58 200 F. Supp. at 282.
59 200 F. Supp. at 281. See the discussion of San Diego in Donald C. MacDonald, 55 T.C.
840, 859 (1971), acq., 1973-1 C.B. 1.
The Service's position expressed in its regulations adopts the thrust of San Diego as
analyzed in this article: "The term 'all substantial rights to a patent' means all rights (whether
or not then held by the grantor) which are of value at the time the rights to the patent (or an
undivided interest therein) are transferred." Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2 (b) (1) (emphasis added).
Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1015 n.5 '(Ct. CL. 1967) took the
view that San Diego and the Regulations were inconsistent; significantly, BelPs quotation of the
Regulations omits the parenthetical phrase emphasized above.
60 55 T.C. 840 (1971), acq., 1973-1 C.B. 1.
61 Id. at 859.
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transferor retained rather than what the transferee received: "The issue of
whether all substantial rights have been transferred (that is, whether there has
been a sale) should arise only when the transferor has retained rights of some
sort."62 Based on this rule it did not matter if less than 100% of the original
patent rights were transferred, rather a sale results when "all remaining rights in
a patent are transferred."6 Since the taxpayer retained nothing, a sale must have
been executed.
A strict application of the MacDonald test yields strange results. What if
MacDonald had owned only a nonexclusive license instead of the exclusive license
considered by the court? If MacDonald assigned all his rights in his nonexclusive
license, under the court's reasoning he would still be entitled to capital gain
treatment since he retained no rights in the patent; the nonexclusive license was
all he owned. Such a conclusion makes a mockery of the all substantial rights test
and indeed cannot be supported under existing law. If the sale of a nonexclusive
license is to qualify for capital gain treatment, it must do so under the rules
applicable to sales of contract rights, not sales of patents and the all substantial
rights test.64 For example, the transfer of a nonexclusive license in exchange for a
fixed sum may qualify for capital gain characterization under circumstances
where the seller is not a "dealer" in patent licenses."
In Transducer Patents Co. v. Renegotiation Board,6 the court also con-
sidered whether the transfer of a patent subject to a preexisting nonexclusive
royalty-free license could qualify for capital gains characterization under the all
substantial rights rule. To its credit, the court did note that prior to the carve-out
of the nonexclusive license the transferor owned all the rights in the patent.
Since a nonexclusive license only permits its owner to share in some rights of the
patent, it necessarily follows that, after the nonexclusive license was granted, the
taxpayer still retained at least some share of each and every right of the patent.
Consequently, when this remaining interest was conveyed, an interest satisfying
the shared rights test was received by the transferee, and thus capital gain charac-
terization may result to the transferor.
Unfortunately, instead of resting its conclusion on shared rights analysis,
Transducer lapsed into applying the retained rights test: The transfer qualified
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Eustice, supra note 22.
65 By executing a transfer in exchange for a fixed sum rather than contingent payments,
the restrictive rules of § 1235, as also extended to § 1221, may be avoided. The fixed considera-
tion potentially relieves the taxpayer from the burden of demonstrating that a share of all
substantial rights in a patent has been conveyed. Since contingent payments are not being
claimed, the property need no longer rise to the level of a patent, permitting the nonexclusive
license to be tested under the rules applicable to contract rights. See note 39 supra. It would
seem that a nonexclusive patent license could satisfy the "property" requirement of Gillette
Motor Transport Inc. Consequently, as long as the license was held for the required period, and
as long as a share of all substantial rights in the nonexclusive license was conveyed, and as long
as the seller is not a "dealer" in nonexclusive licenses so as to invoke the exception of § 1221 (1),
capital gain characterization appears warranted.
If indeed the above hypothesis proves correct, capital gain characterization should result
irrespective of whether the nonexclusive license was sold before or after the remaining rights in
the patent were sold.
66 58 T.C. 329 (1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1973).
67 Id. at 344.
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as a sale because the outstanding license was royalty-free. Since the license was
royalty-free the transferor retained nothing of value and thus capital gain treat-
ment is justified. The court then compounded its error by commenting that it was
not considering whether a sale would result if the taxpayer had retained a right
to receive royalties under a preexisting nonexclusive license of the patent (the
facts of San Diego).6
In Revenue Ruling 78-32869 the Service also addressed the nonexclusive
license question. In an attempt to limit the MacDonald holding, the Service
sought to explain its earlier acquiescence in MacDonald"0 as an acquiescence in
result only, not an indication of agreement with the reasoning of MacDonald.
What the Service found to be determinative of the sale issue was the fact that the
nonexclusive, royalty-free license was carved from the patent before the transferor
received his rights. Thus, in the example discussed in the Ruling the Service states
that a sale has occurred "because Z transferred all the rights it had ever held in
the property."'"
These distinctions drawn by Transducer and the Service are as misleading
as the reasoning of MacDonald itself. All substantial rights of the patent must be
transferred, i.e., received, if a sale of a capital asset is to occur."2 It is immaterial
to the transferee whether the outstanding nonexclusive license pays royalties to
the transferor or is royalty-free; the transferee's rights are identical in either case.
Neither is it relevant whether the nonexclusive license was created by the
transferor-taxpayer or by some earlier transferor from whom the taxpayer
received his interest. Once again, in either instance the rights received by the
transferee are identical.
A retained rights test is nonetheless forced to grapple with such irrelevant
distinctions. The shared rights test does not. A receipt of an exclusive license
subject to a nonexclusive license is a receipt of at least some part of all substantial
rights in the patent. Stated in the alternative, all outstanding rights to the patent
not owned exclusively by the transferee are at least shared with the transferee.
Since the shared rights test looks exclusively to what the transferee receives, a
sale results regardless of who created the outstanding license or whether the
outstanding license pays a royalty.
Transducer relied heavily on the Court of Claims decision in Bell Intercon-
tinental Corp. v. United States. 3 Indeed that case is probably the leading opinion
addressing the issue of transfers subject to nonexclusive licenses. Bell, the trans-
feror-taxpayer, was a member of an industry cross-licensing agreement which re-
quired Bell and all other members to transfer nonexclusive licenses for certain
kinds of patents to the association for use by all members of the association. Under
the terms of the agreement with the association, the association paid Bell a royalty
on the nonexclusive license which it received. When Bell sought to later sell its
68 Id.
69 1978-36 I.R.B. 26.
70 1973-1 C.B. 1.
71 1978-36 I.R.B. 26.
72 The test of sale or exchange requires that "all substantial rights evidenced by the patent
s.. Should be transferred to the transferee for consideration." SENATE REPORT, Supra note 10,
at 439 (emphasis added).
73 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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patent rights, it made the transfer subject to the existing nonexclusive license to
the association as required by its agreement with the association. Bell also reserved
the right to receive any additional royalties which the association might grant on
its nonexclusive license. The Service challenged capital gain treatment of the
transfer based in part on the outstanding nonexclusive license and Bell's reserva-
tion of the right to receive any future royalty payments. 4
Bell correctly found that a sale of a capital asset had occurred. Bell dis-
tinguished the "100 percent of all rights in the patent" rule expressed in San
Diego by relying in part on the undivided interest reasoning upon which the
shared rights test is based: "The first basis for the [San Diego] holding - that a
sale requires transfer of all substantial rights in the patent when issued - would
appear inconsistent with what would seem an established principle that for capital
gain purposes, a taxpayer may sell a partial interest in an invention. 17 The second
argument of San Diego, that the right to receive royalties is in itself a substantial
interest in the patents, was also rejected by Bell. The right to royalties was not a
"substantial property right in a patent," and therefore did not violate the all
substantial rights test.76
The most significant aspect of Bell, however, is that the court to some degree
attempts to conceptualize the basic character of the transaction which occurred,
rather than relying exclusively on a mechanical application of the retained rights
rule. The court characterized the Bell transfer as follows:
By analogy, the [patent transfer] would thus seem no different in princi-
ple than one in which a grantor conveys a fee simple interest in (and,
subject to) an irrevocable easement in perpetuity [which] the grantor had
previously conveyed to a third party. The fact that the grantor in such
circumstances reserved the right to obtain future payments from the easement
holder does not mean that the grantor retained a continuing property interest
in the realty- indeed, in the present illustration he divested himself entirely
of that; it means rather than the grantor retained a contractual right vis-a-vis
the easement holder to receive payments for an interest already conveyed.7 7
To the extent that Bell notes that a fee simple interest in property has been
conveyed even though that property is subject to an outstanding easement, Bell
applies the shared rights test. When a transferee receives property subject to an
easement, as with the receipt of a patent subject to a nonexclusive license, the
right to put the property to productive use is in some degree shared rather than
owned outright. Nonetheless, because these rights are at least shared, all sub-
stantial rights have been transferred, and a sale of property results. 8
74 Id. at 1011-13.
75 Id. at 1014. Unfortunately, Bell cited as an example of partial transfers, conveyances of
fragmented patents, interests which no longer receive capital gain treatment at least under
§ 1235. See text accompanying notes 28-37 supra.
76 Id. at 1015. See Van Dale Corp., 59 T.C. 390, 399 (1972).
77 Id. at 1013. This passage was quoted with apparent approval in Transducer Patents Co.
v. Renegotiation Board, 58 T.C. 329, 344 (1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1973).
78 See also Van Dale Corp., 59 T.C. 390, 399 (1972) which cites Bell as holding that the
outstanding license "did not in any way limit the purchaser's use of the patent and that it did
not constitute the retention of a substantial right in the patent by the seller." The key finding
for the purpose of the shared rights test is that the outstanding interest did not interfere with
the transferee's "use of the patent."
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Applying the same analysis, it should be evident that the shared rights test
would also recognize a sale even in those instances where the transferor has
created and reserved a nonexclusive license at the time he transferred the patents.
It is now accepted that a transfer of all rights in a patent with the simultaneous
grantback to the transferor of a nonexclusive license qualifies as a sale."9 Prac-
tically, and conceptually, a grantback is no different from a transaction in which
the transferor himself reserves the nonexclusive license at the point of initial
transfer. Because the transfers are in reality identical, the identical conclusion of
sale should result.80
The brief opinion in Kavanagh v. Evans"' concludes the analysis of the
retained nonexclusive license question. In Evans the taxpayer retained at transfer
a nonexclusive license to manufacture, sell, and use the patent, albeit limited to a
particular field of use. Without mentioning the field of use restriction the court
stated that it was permissible for the taxpayer to retain the nonexclusive license
and still qualify for capital gain characterization: "It was entirely lawful for him
to retain an undivided part or share of his exclusive patent rights." 2 The reliance
on the "undivided part or share" rule as the basis for permitting the retained
license at least impliedly recognizes the applicability of the shared rights test.
Cases departing from Evans, such as Allied Chemical Corp. v. United
States"3 and Walen v. United States,4 also lend implicit support to the shared
rights analysis of retained licenses. In both Allied Chemical and Walen the court
denied capital gains treatment to taxpayers who retained a nonexclusive license
at the time of the transfer. However, in each instance the transfer was disqualified
not because of the retained license, but rather because the transferor retained
some additional interest which did not satisfy the shared rights test. 5
In Allied Chemical the trial court flatly stated that the nonexclusive license
retained by the transferor had value at the time of the transfer and therefore,
under the retained rights test, no sale occurred as the "all substantial rights" rule
was violated." The Court of Appeals, however, carefully avoided resting its
conclusion on this reasoning, focusing instead on the transferor's retained right to
79 Charlson v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R. 2d 5913 (Ct. Cl. trial opinion), aff'd per curiam,
525 F.2d 1046 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ; Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1964). Note,
as well, that a sale of a patent with the grantback of an exclusive license will be ignored as a mere
device for converting ordinary income on future use of the patent into capital gain. Gruber v.
United States, 158 F. Supp. 510 (D. Ore. 1958), rev'd sub nom., Mayer v. United States,
285 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1960). The willingness of the court in Gruber to examine the net result
of the transfers supports the hypothesis that a transferor's retention of a nonexclusive license
does not preclude capital gain characterization. The Ninth Circuit later reversed the district
court stating that a sale occurred at the precise time when the seller-partnership dissolved,
transferring the bulk of its assets to a corporation. The result of the creation of the corporation
was to separate the obligor under the exclusive license from the obligee under the original sale
of the patent. 285 F.2d at 685.
80 See General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944). But
see alto Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56, 61 (6th Cir. 1964).
81 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951).
82 Id. at 236.
83 370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967).
84 273 F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1959).
85 Bell takes a somewhat contrary approach, viewing Allied Chemical and Walen as limiting
or casting doubt on the proposition in Evans that a retained nonexclusive license does not in
itself preclude capital gain characterization. 381 F.2d at 1014 n.4. See also 273 F.2d at 602 n.3.
86 Allied Chemical Corp. v. United States, 66-1 U.S.T.C. 9212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd,
370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967).
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compel the transferee to sublicense its interest for the transferor's benefit." This
power over sublicenses was not shared with the transferee; and as a result capital
gain treatment was precluded. The Court of Appeals in Allied Chemical thus
reached the result dictated by the shared rights test.
In a similar fashion the court in Walen distinguished Evans on the basis that
in addition to the nonexclusive license retained by the transferor, the transferor
also retained the right to prohibit the transferee from sublicensing his interest.
Although the transferee had some right to restrict the transferor's sublicensing
activities, the court found that the transferee's veto power was not equivalent to
the powers retained by the transferor.8 8 Stated in terms of the shared rights test,
the power to restrict sublicenses was not shared and thus capital gain characteriza-
tion cannot result. The effect of retained sublicensing restrictions on patent
transfers is discussed in greater detail infra.s9
The identical shared rights analysis also resolves characterization questions
arising from transfers of patents subject to other retained benefits. For example,
although some courts have held that a sale will be denied where the transferor
retains for himself a right to manufacture, in each instance the rights retained by
the taxpayer were superior to those granted to the transferee;9" the retained
interests were not shared and therefore did not satisfy the shared rights test. Where
the manufacturing right is shared, a sale results." Similarly, the right to sue for
infringement may be retained by the transferor when the right is exercised for the
mutual benefit of the transferor and transferee.2
It is instructive to conclude this discussion of partial transfers by discussing
one example where a proper application of the shared rights test would save a
court from reaching an illogical result. 3 In David R. Blake94 the court considered
whether the transfer of a patent limited in field of use, i.e., fragmented, would
qualify as a sale under the all substantial rights test of § 1235. The court first
determined that under the Golsen9" rule the court was constrained to follow the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Fawick v. Commissioner which barred capital gain
treatment for transfers of patents limited in field of use. Blake, however, involved
two transfers, each limited to one of the only two valuable uses which the patent
had. The court noted that Fawick would deny capital gain characterization to the
transfer of the first fragment; but refused to apply Fawick to the transfer of the
87 370 F.2d at 699.
88 273 F.2d at 602.
89 See text accompanying notes 100-113 infra.
90 E.g., in Kirby v. United States, 297 F.2d 466 '(5th Cir. 1961), the taxpayer conveyed
only the right to manufacture and lease, retaining to himself the exclusive right to manufacture
and sell. In Franz Martini, 38 T.C. 168 (1962), the court found that no right to manufacture
was ever conveyed to the transferee.
91 Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56, 60-61 (6th Cir. 1964). See Parke, Davis &
Co., 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934) ; see also quotation at note 80 supra.
92 See Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955); Parke, Davis & Co., 31
B.T.A. 427 (1934).
93 Additionally, in Watkins v. United States, 252 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
936 (1958), the court denied a sale based upon an extensive list of rights retained by the
transferor, focusing to a substantial degree on the taxpayer's retained license.
94 67 T.C. 7 (1976).
95 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971).
96 Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971).
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second fragment. Focusing exclusively on what the transferor retained the court
determined that the taxpayer held nothing of value in the patent after the second
field of use was transferred. Since the taxpayer transferred all of the substantial
rights which he then held, a capital transaction under § 1235 occurred with
respect to the transfer of the second fragment." Thus, Blake reinterpreted Fawick
to mean that no capital gain treatment will be granted transfers of fragmented
patents, except for the transfer of the last fragment.
In this manner Blake is a classic illustration of the proverbial "distinction
without a difference." There is no reason why the last fragment is conceptually
different from the first fragment. A transferee receives exactly the same interest
regardless of whether his field of use was carved out first or carved out last. Since
the identical rights are transferred in each case, so must the characterization of
the transfer be the same in each case.9 8 The shared rights test would reach the
result advocated by the Commissioner with respect to each and every fragment,
first or last. When a fragmented patent is transferred the transferee does not
receive at least some share of each and every right of the patent, therefore no sale
will have resulted. Blake has been appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
VI. Retained Burdens and the Shared Rights Test
Quite often, instead of retaining a visibly productive benefit, the right
retained by the transferor will impose on the transferee some burden which
potentially restricts the transferee's full use of the patent rights which he had
obtained. As with retained benefits, retained rights analysis will ask if the burden
retained by the transferor has value. The shared rights test, however, presumes
the retained right to be valuable and asks instead whether a right reciprocal to
the burden retained is held by the transferee. The shared rights test focuses ex-
clusively on what the transferee receives. If a right equivalent to the burden
retained by the transferor is held by the transferee then the transferee's rights are
not subservient to those of the transferor and the transferee thus owns at least
some part of each and every right of the patent. Alternatively, consider the right
in question as held in common by both the transferor and the transferee, with
both parties agreeing to restrict their exercise of that right.
Employing the Bell technique of real property concepts, a transfer of a patent
subject to a burden is analogous to the transfer of real property subject to a
restrictive covenant. Where the recipient can enforce a similar covenant against
his neighbors it is clear that the transferee has lost nothing; in fact the value of
his property is probably enhanced. In the case of patents as well, where the
transferee owns rights equivalent to the burden retained by the transferor all
rights to the patent are at least shared by the transferee. These rights may be
shared in a negative sense; but they are shared nonetheless. The remainder of
this article will address the reciprocal rights test: the shared rights test as applied
to burdens.99
97 67 T.C. at 16.
98 See Wiseman v. Barby, 380 F.2d 121 (10h Cir.), rev'd, 390 U.S. 339, reh. den., 390
U.S. 1036 (1967).
99 The infamous Dairy Queen cases, involving transfers of franchises prior to the enactment
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Probably the most common burden imposed in a patent transfer is to restrict
the transferee's ability to sublicense or subassign the patent to others. Since most
modern courts will apply the retained rights test of value, a "general rule" has
developed that in normal circumstances the transferor's retention of a right to
prohibit or restrict further sublicensing of the patent is not the retention of a
right valuable enough to violate the all substantial rights test."°' This general rule
is uncomfortably applied, however, in that one is never quite sure as to what
constitutes the abnormal circumstance where the retained right is indeed sub-
stantial.
By concentrating on value the courts are of course undertaking the wrong
inquiry. The proper question is whether the transferee has received reciprocal
rights to the burdens imposed on his interest. Under the shared rights test a sale
will occur only in those circumstances where the transferee has a right to restrict
the sublicenses of the transferor at least equivalent to the right which the trans-
feror retained. If the transferee lacks such a reciprocal right then he lacks at least
some share in all rights of the patent and no sale may result. All retained rights
are presumed to be valuable; the true concern is whether such rights are reciprocal.
The germinal case in the area of sublicensing restrictions, Parke, Davis &
Co.,' articulates the shared rights analysis advanced throughout this article. In
Parke, Davis, the Service argued that the transfer of certain patents was a license
rather than a sale since the taxpayer retained, inter alia, the right to prevent a
subsequent sale or sublicense of the patent, and, additionally, the transferor alone
was permitted to bring suit for infringement of the patent. The court stated that
the retention of these rights would normally prevent a "sale." However, since in
this particular case the retained rights were held in common between the trans-
feror and the transferee, a sale nonetheless resulted:
It is true that a right to sell the invention or to grant to others a license was
not transferred to Lilly, but petitioner by the agreement surrendered the right
to exercise these privileges without Lilly's consent, so that its rights in this
respect were no greater than those of the latter. Upon execution of the agree-
of § 1235, may also illustrate the shared rights test. Although the cases are difficult to reconcile,
the courts generally permitted capital gain characterization where the rights retained by the
transferor were designed to promote and preserve the quality of the product, thereby benefitting
all the franchise holders. See, e.g., Moberg v. Commissioner, 310 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1962);
Estate of Gowdey, 307 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962); Dairy Queen of Oklahoma v. Commissioner,
250 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1957). Cf. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.2d
400 (2d Cir. 1978) (restrictions designed to protect the trade name in a retained field of use did
not negate a sale).
However, the courts denied capital gain treatment if the rights retained by the transferor
appeared to be for his individual benefit. See, e.g., Resorts Int'l v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 107
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Wernentin, 354 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1965); Walter T. Roob,
50 T.C. 891 (1968); see also, Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.
1974). Cf. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436 '(7th Cir. 1978) (where
consideration involves no lump sum payment but is entirely in the form of royalties, no capital
gain treatment will result).
100 See, e.g., Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957); Lawrence v. United
States, 242 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1955) ;
Arras v. United States, 164 F.Supp. 150 (D. Conn. 1958); Glen O'Brien Moveable Partition Co.,
70 T.C. 492 (1978); Newton Insert Co., 61 T.C. 570 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 545 F.2d
1259 (9th Cir. 1976); William W. Taylor, 29 T.C.M. 1488 (1970); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1235-2(b) (3) (i).
101 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934).
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ment neither had the right to sell or license without the permission of the
other. ... It is true that petitioner retained the legal title to the patents as
well as any future improvements thereon and alone could sue for their in-
fringement, but such suit was to be for the benefit of both, its cost to be borne
equally by the two and any judgment secured for the infringement was the
property of the two in equal proportions. As a result of these conditions we
can see no more than the retention by petitioner of the naked legal title in
the interest and for the benefit of itself and Eli Lilly & Co. as the joint owners
in equal proportions of the entire beneficial interest in the patents and
improvements thereon. 10 2
Significantly, the actual agreement did not appear to expressly mention that the
parties were to own all rights in equal proportions. Nonetheless, the court ruled
that since those rights retained by the taxpayer had also been granted to Lilly, the
transferee, there was joint ownership of the rights and a sale had been effected. In
other words each right retained by the transferor was also at least shared by the
transferee, and the all substantial rights test was thereby met.
Parke, Davis is followed in importance by the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Rollman v. Commissioner. 3 In that case the taxpayers transferred their patent
and, in order to protect the value of their royalty, required that the transferee
obtain their written consent before granting any sublicenses. Two rationales were
employed by the court to reach the conclusion that the retained right to prohibit
sublicenses was not a substantial right. On the one hand, the court reasoned that
since the transferor had no rights in the patent itself, the transferor also could not
grant sublicenses without the transferee's consent.' In other words the restriction
on sublicensing was shared within the rationale of Parke, Davis & Co. (and the
reciprocal rights rule) and therefore did not defeat a sale. Such reciprocal rights
reasoning alone is sufficient to reach the result in Rollman.
The court, however, also employed an alternative basis for reaching its con-
clusion: The transferor conveyed all substantial rights in the patent because the
right to sell the patent is not a substantial right of the patent: "Such a limitation
does not interfere with the full use of the patent by the [transferee] and its serves
to protect both parties to the assignment in case the purchase price is paid in
installments."' 0 5
Rollman's implication that a restriction against sublicensing will never be
the retention of a substantial right is without foundation once a transaction falls
outside the reciprocal obligations which existed in the specific case of the Rolman
transfer. Although not a right peculiar to a patent, the right to sell to another is
inherent in the general nature of the ownership of property, and therefore a right
which should normally be conveyed before a patent can be considered to have
102 Id. at 430-31.
103 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957).
104 Id. at 640. Newton Insert Co., 61 T.C. 570, 580 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 545 F.2d 1259(9th Cir. 1976) (failure to grant the right to sublicense does not defeat a sale, i.e., constitute
the reservation of a substantial right, since the transferor was foreclosed from granting other
licenses by the exclusiveness of the transferee's license). William W. Taylor, 29 T.C:M. 1488(1970) (the transferor was also precluded from making assignments himself; therefore a sale
occurred).
105 244 F.2d at 640.
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been "sold."' ° By failing to limit its holding to the reciprocal rights rule em-
ployed by the court in Parke, Davis & Co., Rollman created the potential for
taxpayer abuse in situations of restricted rights to sublicense which in practical
impact are not reciprocal and not for the mutual benefit of both parties. For
example, the Rollman presumption in favor of the insubstantial nature of the
retained right clearly does not apply to instances where the transferor also retains
an undivided interest in the other rights of the patent. Without a reciprocal re-
striction on the transferor's right to sublicense, the net effect of the retained
interests is a grant of a mere nonexclusive license.
Jacques R. Milberg'", reached this exact conclusion based on slightly more
complicated facts. At the time of the transfer in question two undivided one-half
interests were outstanding in the patent. One of these undivided interests was
transferred, with the grantor reserving a termination provision less than the life
of the patent, and further imposing a clause which prohibited the transferee
from assigning or sublicensing his interest. Although the termination provision
alone was sufficient to negate a sale, the court also determined that the effect of
the sublicense bar was to limit the transferee's rights to a nonexclusive sublicense.
Even though the grantor by himself could not grant further licenses, the grantor
and the owner of the other one-half interest could. The court therefore viewed
the sublicensing restriction as the retention of a continuing beneficial interest by
the grantor, since the grantor and the other owner could receive additional
royalties through sublicenses of the remaining one-half interest.,',
The better analysis looks only at the transferee. The prohibition against
assignment imposed by the grantor was not coupled with a reciprocal right
permitting the grantee to prohibit sublicenses of the remaining one-half interest.
The transferee did not own at least some part of all of the rights of the patent and
therefore no sale occurred.
A similar conclusion was reached in Walen v. United States... where further
sublicenses were contemplated by the transferor on its interest, while the trans-
feree was prohibited from sublicensing. Although the agreement granted the
transferee a veto power over further licenses by the transferor, the court deter-
mined that this veto power was not absolute, and not equivalent to the sub-
licensing restriction retained by the transferor."'
106 Jacques R. Milberg, 52 T.C. 315 (1969). See Cubic Corp. v. United States, 72-1
U.S.T.C. V 9165 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, ... F.2d .... '(9th Cir. 1974); see also Edward W. Reid,
50 T.C. 33 (1968) ; Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455 (1964), acq., 1965-1 C.B. 4 (both
involving transfers of trade secrets).
107 52 T.C. 315.
108 Id. at 318-19.
109 273 F.2d 599 (lst Cir. 1959).
110 Id. at 602. Consider as well the case of Edward W. Reid, 50 T.C. 33 (1968), which
involved a transfer of a secret formula subject to an obligation that the transferee would not
disclose the formula to anyone else; in other words, the transferee could neither assign nor sub-
license the secret. The court denied capital gain treatment stating: "This striving for secrecy
.. . indicates that [the transferor intended to preserve its property rights in the trade secret for
possible future use - an intent which is consistent only with a license, not a sale." Id. at 41.
Of critical importance to shared rights analysis is footnote 6 of the court's opinion which com-
mented that although the transferor was also subject to nondisclosure provisions, these provisions
were not for permanent nondisclosure. Id. In other words, the disclosure limitation was not
shared equally, and therefore no sale could have occurred.
In Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455 (1964), acq., 1965-1 C.B. 4, another trade
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The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Eickmeyer v. Commissioner further
illustrates how the courts will realistically examine whether the sublicensing right
is shared or retained for the predominant benefit of the transferor. Where the
transferor's retained right to sublicense is effectively superior to the transferee's
right to sublicense, capital gain characterization will be denied."1 In similar
fashion, when the transferor can compel the transferee to create sublicenses once
again a license rather than a sale results because the right to create, or not to
create, additional licenses is not shared by the transferor and transferee." 2
Even when the transferor has otherwise parted with all rights in the patent,
the mere retention of a sublicensing restriction can still violate the shared rights
test. Consider for example the following international setting: USA Corp. owns
patents (on a particular invention) in countries A, B, C, and D. USA transfers
all rights in the D patent to FORCO, retaining only the right to prohibit
FORCO from further sublicensing or assigning the D patent. Since USA retains
patents on the invention, the retention of the right to prohibit FORCO from
sublicensing is the retention of a valuable and substantial right in the D patent.
Since the invention is patented only in A, B, C, and D, any corporation with
access to the technology is free to compete in all those countries where there is
no outstanding patent on the invention. Since FORCO cannot sublicense the
D patent, FORCO's rights in the invention are subordinate to USA who can
create additional owners in A, B, and C, owners who, once established in their
own markets, can economically compete with FORCO in the unpatented terri-
tories. By retaining to itself the exclusive right to create additional owners who
can readily compete in unpatented countries, USA has retained a substantial right
in the D patent which is not shared with FORCO. The restraint on sublicensing
is not for the mutual benefit of both parties, as was the case in Rollman, but for
the exclusive benefit of USA. Since FORCO cannot restrain the sublicensing of
secret case, the court also found that a prohibition on assignment coupled with the inability of
the transferee to prohibit further disclosures by the transferor required the conclusion that only
a license had been effected. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
111 580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978). In Eickmeyer the taxpayer sought to sell undivided
one percent interests in his patent rights claiming capital gains treatment on his profits. The
agreement was so structured that although each transferee could sublicense his interest, he could
not do so without the proceeds of the sublicense flowing upward to the transferor. The court
determined that this arrangement effectively precluded any sublicensing of the interests. Conse-
quently, the court denied capital gains treatment based upon Eickmeyer's retention of "the
all-important right to collect for all uses of the patent whether by the original transferee or
subsequent ones." Id. at 399. The court found that such control over sublicenses, coupled with
the number of interests carved out of the patent, created in practical effect nonexclusive licenses
which failed to satisfy the all substantial rights test. "The unlimited power enjoyed by Eick-
meyer to create new licenses or owners also serves to reveal the true character [the grant of
only a nonexclusive license] of his property interest." Id. at 400.
The rationale of Eickmeyer can be stated more elegantly by applying the reciprocal rights
rule. The transferees had no reciprocal right to limit the sublicenses granted by Eickmeyer.
Eickmeyer thereby retained a valuable right in the patent which was not reciprocally granted to
his transferees. In so retaining solely to himself the sublicensing right, Eickmeyer failed to satisfy
the reciprocal rights rule and as a result breached the "all substantial rights" requirement of
section 1235. See also Hagen, Are Capital Gains Still Available via Patent Fragmentations? A
Current Analysis, 43 J. TAXATION 78 (1975) '(discussing the possibility of maximizing capital
gains through the sale of undivided interests). See generally Leubsdorf v. United States, 164
F. Supp. 234 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
112 Allied Chemical Corp. v. United States, 370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967); see Schmitt v.
Commissioner, 271 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1959).
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the invention by USA, as it could in Rollman, no reciprocal rights have been
created and the all substantial rights requirement has not been satisfied. Arguably,
however, at least one court has reached this very result.1 '
One should be aware that in the international setting reciprocal restrictions
on sublicensing may satisfy the tax law, but also create problems with respect to
U.S. antitrust laws, particularly when combined with territorial market alloca-
tions. 1 Coincidentally, attempts by sellers to avoid the antitrust implication that
they are dividing world markets has created a new retained right, the retained
import right, which under the retained rights test of value creates immediate
problems for the seeker of capital gains.
United States antitrust law, as applied to foreign commerce, may require a
U.S. transferor of a patent to retain for himself the right to import into the
transferee's country. Since a patent customarily grants exclusive manufacturing
and selling rights within the country of the patent, the Service is quick to chal-
lenge the retention of such a right to import as the reservation of a substantial
right in the patent violative of the all substantial rights test. The court, under the
retained rights test, is then forced to evaluate the economic value of the retained
import right. Where the right has clear value the seller's compliance with the
antitrust law precludes him from ever selling his patent for a capital gain."'
The case of Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. United States illustrated
this very dilemma."' In that case Hooker entered into an agreement with two
foreign corporations for the transfer of patents and related technology concerning
certain chemical processes. Some patent rights were transferred to each corpora-
tion so that each had its own exclusive sales territory, while other patent rights
governing a specific territory were transferred to be held in common by the two
corporations. In order to preclude a challenge that it was illegally dividing world
markets (the facts can be viewed as generally approximating the famous Timken
Roller Bearing.7 case), Hooker retained to itself the right to import into the
transferees' geographic territories. Hooker granted reciprocal import rights to its
113 In Oak Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1962), foreign
patent rights were transferred subject to a number of restrictions including the bar to further
assignments and the reservation by the transferor of the right to apply for patents in other
countries. The court intuitively recognized that the transfer was more in the nature of an agency
relationship than the execution of a sale of patent rights. However, the retained rights con-
denmed by Oak were all rights customarily permitted transferors in the domestic setting, e.g.,
the sublicense bar and the right to control infringement suits. See, e.g., Parke, Davis & Co.
discussed in the text accompanying notes 101-107 supra.
Although the result in Oak is perplexing when viewed entirely from traditional retained
rights tests, the court's conclusion is readily understood when compared with the USA-FORCO
agreement discussed in the text. See Continental Carbon Co. v. United States, 37 A.F.T.R. 2d
318 (S.D. Tex. 1975), where the transferor's competition with the transferee in world markets,
coupled with a sublicensing restriction imposed upon the transferee's patent, precluded sale
treatment.
But see E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir.
1970) where the court mechanically applied Rollman to an international transfer of patent
rights.
114 See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1973).
115 See J. BIScHEL, TAXATION OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS AND KNow-How
1-9 to 1-10 (Supp. 1976) where the argument is made that the retained rights test should yield
to the antitrust laws, at least in some circumstances.
116 42 A.F.T.R. 2d 5231 (Ct. Cl. trial opinion 1978).
117 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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transferees." 8 The Service sought to deny Hooker capital gains treatment of the
transfer under § 1222(3) based in part upon the retention of this import right
which the Service claimed to be substantial.
The determination of the import issue resolved to a factual question of
whether the import right was substantial; did the right have substantive economic
value? The court found that the right had no practical value and therefore was
not a substantial right retained by the transferor. The court noted that due to
prohibitive shipping costs it was not feasible for Hooker to compete with its
transferees in their countries. The court further found that only the foreign
transferees could provide foreign purchasers the technical assistance necessary for
the purchaser to use the product. Finally, the court buttressed its conclusion by
the Service's own concession that Hooker rarely exercised its import right, and
when it did, it did so only at the request of the transferees themselves." 9
The court in Hooker reached the correct result only after a painstaking
factual analysis of value. The reciprocal rights test resolves Hooker in a single
paragraph: Hooker transferred all substantial rights in the patents with the sole
exception of the retained right to import from the United States into the trans-
feree's countries. In exchange for this retained right Hooker granted its transferees
the reciprocal right to import from their countries into the United States. Since
the import rights were thus shared, each transferee received at least some part of
each and every right of the patent, and the all substantial rights test had been
satisfied.
Most importantly, the reciprocal rights rule eliminates all questions of value
and thereby eliminates the dilemma which forces the seller to choose between
the tax law and the antitrust law. Unlike the facts as found in Hooker, corpora-
tions will often own patents on products that can readily be exported eco-
nomically. In such an instance a retained import right will be of clear value, and,
therefore, under the retained rights test no sale can be completed except by
risking a violation under the antitrust laws. However, if in retaining the import
right the transferor also conveys to the transferee the right to import into his own
country, then selling rights are shared, and, under the reciprocal rights test, all
substantial rights have been transferred. The value of the right is entirely irrele-
vant to this inquiry; indeed the shared rights test presumes the import right to
be valuable. Rather, the question is only whether the rights are in fact equivalent
or reciprocal. 2
118 42 A.F.T.R. 2d at 5233.
119 Id. at 5234-36.
120 Where each party has the right to sell throughout the entire territory of the other, it
would seem that in almost every circumstance rights will be reciprocal. However, one can
envision a contrary result if the transferor may sell throughout the territory of the transferee,
but the transferee has import rights limited to but one of many countries in which the transferor
holds patents. It would seem logical that if the transferor's import rights were limited to goods
originating from one country, assume for example the United States, then a reciprocal import
right granted to the transferee limited to the United States would nonetheless be reciprocal in
the sense of creating "in common" ownership within the meaning of the grant of an undivided
interest. However, such a right to import limited to the United States would not be reciprocal
where the transferor could import into the transferee's country from anywhere in the world.
Further complications result if one of the countries from which the product originates is not a
consumer of that product.
Illustrating that some analysis may be required before the reciprocal rights test is applied
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VII. Is the Shared Rights Test Exclusive?
Finally, this article has repeatedly implied that the shared rights test is the
exclusive test of capital gain for patent transfers. It has been presumed that a
right, if retained, is substantial; otherwise the grantor would not have bothered
to retain it. Consequently, not only does the shared rights test state that a sale
will result if retained rights are all shared (and all substantial rights to the patent
are otherwise transferred) ; but the test also states that if a retained right is not
shared no sale can result. In highly unusual circumstances, however, the presump-
tion of value may be rebutted and this latter conclusion will not necessarily follow.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Ca. v. United States..' (1970), is the only
known case in the patent field justifying an "exception" to the shared rights test.
DuPont, in order to satisfy what it believed to be the requirements of an antitrust
decree, retained the right to import into Brazil upon its sale of a Brazilian patent.
Apparently DuPont granted no reciprocal import right to its transferee. The
court held the retained import right to be insubstantial based upon Brazilian trade
law. Since the transferee was a Brazilian company the parties expected the
Brazilian government to bar DuPont from importing into Brazil in competition
with its transferee; and in fact the Brazilian government so acted. As a result the
import right was without value and a sale had been executed. 2
Three comments should be made about this "exception" to the shared rights
test: (1) The right retained by DuPont was "given back" to the buyer by local
law and governmental practice. In actual fact, DuPont retained no legal rights
in the patent, and even the shared rights test is satisfied. (2) The right was
retained pursuant to compliance with an antitrust decree. Thus DuPont by its own
act of retention did not indicate the right to be of substantial value. (3) And
finally, given Brazilian practice of barring imports, it was most likely impractical
from a business standpoint to grant the transferee a reciprocal right without such
a large adjustment in royalty as would render the agreement unattractive from
the standpoint of the buyer. Consequently, if DuPont represents an exception to
the shared rights test, it is certainly a limited one.
To conclude, as noted earlier, a transfer of an asset should be granted capital
gain treatment depending upon the property characteristics of the asset trans-
ferred. An analysis of the legal relationships of the rights conveyed, not an eco-
nomic assessment of the rights retained, is necessary if the property characteristics
of an asset are to be properly evaluated. The shared rights test accomplishes such
a property analysis; the retained rights test does not.
is the case of Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455 (1964), where the court determined that
a transfer of trade secrets did not implement a sale where, among other rights, the transferor
retained the right to import into the transferee's country.
121 432 F.2d 1052.
122 Id. at 1055-56.
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